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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
v. 
TROVON DONTA ROSS, 
Appellant/Defendant 
Case No. 20041073-SC 
(incarcerated) 
ARGUMENTS 
L THE ANONYMOUS JURY REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
The State's brief erroneously contends that Ut R. Jud. Admin.4-202.02 required the trial 
court to impanel an anonymous or number-identified jury. State's brief at 22-25. Rule 4-202.02 
(D) governs the privacy of "records" of information identifying jurors or aiding in their location. 
Rule 4-202.01(3) defines records as tangible written or recorded materials, and does not define 
records in a manner that requires jurors to be referred to by number or anonymously in court. 
See id. ('"Record" means books, letters, documents, papers, maps, plans, photographs, films, 
cards, tapes, recordings, data or other materials, regardless of form or characteristics, that are 
reproducible."). 
The State erroneously contends that referring to jurors by name in open court would 
defeat the purpose of the rule, and contends that juror anonymity is required in court, as well 
as in the dissemination of tangible records. State's brief at 24. The State does not explain how 
this interpretation of the rule is or can be limited in any fashion, and under the State's 
interpretation, the rule would ostensibly require such anonymous jury procedures in all cases. 
See id. Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-202, which elucidates the purpose of rules including 4-202.02, 
recognizes the importance of balancing the public interests served by open courts and open 
government (promoting public confidence and accountability of public servants) against 
individual privacy interests. See id. While individual jurors may be concerned about their 
privacy, the public needs our judicial system to function in the open and on the record, so that 
jurors and all public servants function in an accountable manner. See id. See also. State v. 
Jordan. 196 P. 565, 616-17 (Utah 1921)(in explaining wh) criminal trials are open to the public, 
the Court noted that "the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to 
a sense of their responsibility."). 
The State acknowledges and relies on case law recognizing that anonymous juries are 
"permissible when there is a strong reason to believe the jury needs protection and there are 
reasonable safeguards in place to minimize the risk of prejudice to the defendant" State's brief 
at 26 (citing cases). But the State fails to acknowledge that the administrative rule upon which 
it relies includes no such limitations and ostensibly applies in all cases in Utah, regardless of 
whether there is any need to protect the jury, and regardless of whether any safeguards are used 
to protect the defendant from the prejudice attendant to anonymous juries. 
The State refers to the trial court's decorum order, and posits that the anonymous jury 
procedures in this case were justified by the trial court's and trial counsel's concerns about press 
harassment of jurors. State's brief at 27. The potential that news reporters may harass jurors 
is present in every case in which a reporter or news source might become interested, and there 
is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court or trial counsel had any reason to believe 
2 
that the press coverage or behavior of the reporters in this case would be so extreme as to 
require anonymous jury procedures. Calling the jurors by number did nothing to ameliorate this 
potential concern, which was independendy and thoroughly addressed by the Court's decorum 
order, which forbade reporters to publish the name or address of any jurors, to photograph the 
jurors, or to contact actual or prospective jurors until they were discharged from their service 
(R. 203-04). 
In arguing that the trial court took proper precautionary measures to insure that the 
anonymous jury proceedings did not prejudice Ross, the State concedes that one of Ross's actual 
jurors, juror number 35, was never addressed by name. State's brief at 21 n.3, citing R. 254; 
424:9-12, 433: 15). In cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel, as this one does, 
prejudice is shown by proof of a reasonable probability that one juror may have voted 
differently.1 Even if the one juror who was always called by number did not establish prejudice, 
but see Wiggins, jurors were interviewed individually in the jury room during voir dire (e.g. R. 
424 at 8), and were thus not aware that Judge Page referred to many of them by name in Ross's 
presence. Those jurors who were mentioned by name may have assumed that the use of his or 
her name once during voir dire was a mistake, as the court consistendy referred to the jurors by 
number in all other instances.2 
Wiggins v. Smith. 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (reversing capital sentence for ineffective 
assistance after concluding that if the defense case had been handled competendy, there was 
"a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance."). 
2The State suggests that Ross's rights to the presumption of innocence and to a fair 
trial were not jeopardized because the jurors were at times referred to by name in Ross's 
presence. See State's brief at 27. Under the State's interpretation of Rule 4-202.02, however, 
no such instances of name revelation should have occurred in this case, or would be 
3 
The State's brief also concedes that the trial court told some of the prospective jurors, 
including one of the actual jurors, number 43, that they were being referred to by number for 
their "protection." State's brief at 21 citing R. 424: 135, 164, 248). While the State is correct 
that the trial court informed many of the other jurors that they were being referred to by number 
for their "benefit," the State fails to note that the court actually informed many of them that the 
procedure was being used "primarily" or "basically" for their benefit (e.g.. R. 434: 9, 13, 22), 
implying that the process served another or other purposes as well. Moreover, given the fact 
that anonymous juries are virtually unheard of in our state court proceedings, there is a high 
likelihood that the jurors inferred that the benefit the court was trying to bestow on them by 
keeping their identities secret was to protect them from Mr. Ross or his family or associates. 
Cf. e.g..State v. Brown. 118 P.3d 1273,1279-84 (Kan. 2005)(noting that jurors normally infer 
that they are being kept anonymous because the defendant poses a danger to them). 
The one actual juror who was told that the anonymous procedures were in place for his 
protection is enough to establish prejudice in the ineffective assistance arena, in any event. Cf. 
Wiggins, supra. 
The State seems to indicate confusion with regard to how subsections (a)(1) and (2) of 
U t R. Crim. P. 18 are interpreted to require using the juror names in court. State's brief at 24. 
The plain language of both subsection of the rule defines juries as those "whose names are so 
called" at the end of jury selection proceedings. See id. (emphasis added). As the State's own 
brief recognizes, voir dire proceedings are constitutionally required to be in open court for 
permitted by the rule in other cases. See id. 
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public observation. See, e.g.. State's brief at 26 n. 5 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court of California. 464 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1984), for the proposition that the "Supreme Court 
has considered the effect of juror anonymity on the open courts guarantee and held that voir dire 
proceedings are a part of the trial the public has a right to observe."). Rule 18fs mandate that 
the jurors be called by name, and the constitutions' mandate that jury selection occurs in open 
court lead to the conclusion that the trial court and counsel both plainly erred in referring to 
Ross's jurors by number. See id. See also Jordan, supra. 
The State does not refute Ross's arguments that the error should be viewed as structural, 
that at a minimum, the constitutional error requires the State to prove it harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that, in the alternative, Ross can prove prejudice from the error. Ross 
stands by these unrefuted arguments. See Ross's opening brief at 12-15. 
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
The State contends that the prosecutor properly argued that "defendant drew his gun 
after James came out of the bedroom." State's brief at 28. The State argues that May testified 
that Ross pulled his gun only after both May and Annie were present, State's brief at 31. The 
State argues that the jury permissibly may have inferred from this that Ross "waited until all 
occupants of the house were present because he intended to kill everyone in the house." State's 
brief at 31. 
It is indisputable that Ross drew his gun at a point after James came out of the bedroom 
(e.g.. R. 433 at 47, 65), but that is not what the prosecutor argued. He argued that the jurors 
could infer Ross's intent to kill both Christensen and May in his capital offenses, in part because, 
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"J.T. comes out, he pulls the gun at that time." (R. 434: 15). Accord State's brief at 31. 
While the prosecutor's actual argument was undoubtedly helpful in the State's quest to 
prove that Ross's murder of Christensen was incident to the same act, scheme course of conduct 
or criminal episode as his attempt to kill May, it was factually incorrect. May actually testified 
that Ross initially addressed him, "So you're J.T.?" and then asked Christensen as series of 
questions before she refused to answer them and the "mood changed" and Ross pulled the gun 
(R. 433:44-45). On cross-examination, May testified that "when she didn't answer the questions 
to his liking, that's when he pulled the gun from his waist side." (R. 433: 61). This testimony 
reflects that Ross did not pull his gun when May appeared from the bedroom, as the prosecutor 
argued, but instead shows that it was Christensen's unwillingness to tell May the true nature of 
her relationship with Ross that provoked Ross to pull the gun. 
While the State does not fully quote the prosecutor's arguments, the State concedes that 
there was no factual basis for the prosecutor's arguments that: 
He doesn't order just Annie back to that bedroom. He orders Mr. May back to 
the bedroom as well. He starts them back to the bedroom. And it's only as Mr. 
May is passing that hallway that goes out to the garage that Mr. May decides to 
save his life, the only thing he can do is to leave. 
Does that indicate a scheme on behalf of the defendant, attempting to get 
them both back into the bedroom. And I put to you that that's an indication of 
what Mr. May — of what Mr. Ross's intention was is to have both of those 
individuals in that bedroom. 
(R. 434: 15-16). See State's brief at 32. 
The State contends that the inaccuracy is somehow ameliorated by the jury's right to infer 
Ross's intent to kill both Christensen and May from May's testimony that Ross asked him if he 
had any family here, and that May believed Ross intended to kill them both when he grabbed 
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Christensen's arm and pushed her towards the bedroom. State's brief at 32. 
May testified that Ross asked him if he had any family here, and that this question, 
coupled with the drawn gun, made May believe that Ross intended to kill them both (R. 433:46). 
May testified that Ross told May that Ross could not let Christensen hurt May the way she had 
hurt Ross, and grabbed Christensen with the gun pointed toward her, and pushed her past May 
and led her to the bedroom (R. 433: 46). May testified that he told Ross that the Air Force 
would be out looking for May in an effort to dissuade Ross, and that Ross continued to take 
Christensen to the bedroom (R. 433: 47). 
Had the prosecutor properly confined his argument to the true facts, the jurors may well 
have discounted May's belief that Ross intended to kill him because this belief is contradicted 
by Ross's continuous efforts to push Christensen past May and into the bedroom, without 
responding to May and without trying to force May into the bedroom with Christensen. By 
misstating the evidence to persuade the jurors that Ross ordered and started May back to the 
bedroom, the prosecutor replaced the contrary facts testified to by May, and unfairly bolstered 
the State's capital case and undercut Ross's defense that he was guilty of the lesser offense of 
murder because there was no proof of intent to kill both Christensen and May incident to the 
same scheme, act, course of conduct or criminal episode. 
The State concedes that the prosecutor again misstated the evidence in indicating that 
May testified that very few seconds passed between Ross's shooting of Christensen and shooting 
at May, because May did not say how many seconds passed. State's brief at 33. The State does 
not contest the inaccuracy of the prosecutor's argument that Ross's shooting at May followed 
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his shooting of Christensen "immediately," see R. 434: 16. State's brief at 33. The State 
contends that the argument was nonetheless a fair inference from the argument, because May 
testified that he heard the shots of Christensen when May was trying to start his car, and the next 
thing he noticed was that Ross was in the doorway (R. 433: 48). State's brief at 33. 
The State's argument does not account for the facts that May was not starting his car in 
the traditional efficient fashion, but was instead repeatedly trying and failing to start the ignition 
interlock system installed in his car because he had been convicted of DUI (R. 433: 47-48, 65). 
Also, the State's argument does not account for the facts that Ross was standing in the doorway 
looking at May and did not begin shooting until May had thrown his keys out and had taken off 
running (R. 433: 48). These facts emphasize the inaccuracy and impropriety of the prosecutor's 
argument that Ross's capital-qualifying intent to kill both Christensen and May could be inferred 
from May's supposed testimony that Ross's shooting of May followed his shooting of 
Christensen immediately, or by a few seconds. 
The State contends that the prosecutor never argued that Ross's threat to kill 
Christensen's father established the capital murder of Christensen by establishing his intent to 
kill two people. State's brief at 33-34. The State contends, "Rather, he argued that defendant's 
conduct toward Annie, James, and Annie's father demonstrated a scheme to kill them and that 
during the execution of that scheme defendant killed Annie and attempted to kill James." State's 
brief at 33-34. The State's arguments to this effect are lacking citations to the record. But see 
Ut. R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring citations to the record for factual assertions made in 
arguments). The absence of citations is likely explained by the fact that the record does not 
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support the State's representations, but instead captures the prosecutor's true argument: 
I'd put to you that the evidence based on what has been presented to you, the 
evidence that has been given to you was that when Mr. Ross arrived at that home, 
he intended to kill both people. He intended to kill anybody that was in that 
home. Not only did he intend to kill anybody that was in that home, he intended 
to leave and seek out Steve Christensen and finish the job, as he told Mr. 
Christensen. That is a scheme to kill two people. 
(R. 434: 16-17). 
The State never refutes Ross's argument that the prosecutor's argument to this effect at 
trial was legally improper. See e.g., Ross's opening brief at 19, 22. 
The State never discusses the influence of the prosecutor's arguments on the jury's 
assessment of Ross's constitutionally-guaranteed lesser included offense of intentional murder, 
and contends that it need not prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare 
Ross's opening brief at 22-24 with State's brief at 35-36. 
Instead, the State argues harmless error by claiming that the murder of Christensen and 
attempted murder of May were necessarily incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct or 
criminal episode," by asserting factual misstatements in its appellate argument. Contrary to the 
State's contention that "[o]nce he had Annie and James together, he marched Annie to the 
bedroom and shot her to death." (R. 433:46,65,193,437:43), the testimony of the only witness 
to the shootings, James May, reflects that Ross initially spoke calmly to May, and asked 
Christensen a series of questions, and that the mood changed and Ross pulled his gun when and 
because Christensen refused to answer the questions (R. 433: 44-46, 61). There is no evidence 
that Ross went directly to the garage after shooting Christensen, because the only living witness 
who testified, May, was in the garage trying to start his car at the time of the shooting, and did 
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not see Ross until Ross was in the doorway of the garage looking at him (R. 433: 47-48). But see 
State's brief at 35. The State's claim that the attempted murder of May followed the murder of 
Christensen by seconds, State's brief at 36, is refuted by its own concession that there was no 
evidence of how much time passed between the murder of Christensen and Ross's shooting of 
May, State's brief at 33. The State never identifies the single criminal objective that it argues that 
Ross was pursuing when he shot Christensen and also shot at May, and none is readily apparent 
from the record. State's brief at 36. 
The fact that Ross shot at May multiple times and hit him in the arm with a bullet that 
also penetrated his chest, State's brief at 35, does not necessarily establish attempted murder.3 
The State's argument on appeal that Ross's intent to kill multiple people and qualify for 
his capital conviction is proved by his killing of Christensen and his call to her father indicating 
that he was on his way over to "finish the job" State's brief at 35-36, is improper, because the 
State never charged Ross with attempting to kill Steven Christensen, and never proved a 
substantial step to establish such an attempt under Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, and because 
Ross never had a fair opportunity to defend against that charge. See, e.g.. Christiansen v. Harris. 
163 P.2d 314,317 (Utah 1945) (due process guarantees the accused the right to notice and a fair 
3Compare State v. Casey. 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (jurors instructed on knowing 
and intentional mens reas and convicted of attempted murder; Court found that verdict 
necessarily reflected intentional mens rea, because defendant threatened to kill the victim, put 
the gun to victim's neck, pointed the gun at the victim's head and misfired, pointed the gun 
at the victim's feet and fired, and then fired the gun again as the victim was retreating); State 
v. Haston. 846 P.2d 1276,1277 and n.l (Utah 1993) (Court reversed conviction for 
attempted depraved indifference murder; Haston shot victim in the chest at close range 
during a drunken quarrel). See also State v. Perez. 2002 UT App 211 % 31, 52 P.3d 451 
(noting Haston admitted that he intentionally shot his victim). 
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opportunity to be heard); Constitution of Utah, Article I §§ 7 and 12 (guaranteeing accused's 
rights to notice of the charge and an opportunity to defend); United States Constitution, 
Amendment XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing the right to due process of law); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 
(l)(b) (entitling accused to a copy of the charge). 
The State's suggestion that trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper 
arguments renders them harmless because trial counsel did not draw additional attention to the 
arguments by objecting to them, State's brief at 36, fails to account for the fact that the 
prosecutor's factually and legally improper arguments went right to the merits of the only 
disputed issue in the case, and right to the heart of Ross's defense, that he was not guilty of 
capital murder, but was guilty of the lesser offense, in a case where the jury might have decided 
things differently in the absence of the prosecutorial misconduct. See Ross's opening brief at 
25-27. 
III. T H E C H A R G I N G STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The State cites State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989), in support of its claim that 
Ross lacks standing to bring an Eighth Amendment challenge to the charging statute because 
he was given life without parole, instead of death. State's brief at 38-40. It appears that the 
United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether Eighth Amendment vagueness 
challenges may be brought to challenge capital convictions involving sentences less than death.4 
Particularly because Ross is bringing this claim under the rubric of ineffective assistance 
4Cf. Harmelin v. Michigan. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) at 965 (two Justices indicated that the Eighth 
Amendment requires no proportionality review for non-capital crimes, because "'death is 
different.5") (citations omitted) and at 1001 (three Justices indicated that the Eighth Amendment 
does require proportionality of non-capital crimes). 
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of counsel, this Court should assess the claim in light of the procedural posture of the case 
when trial counsel chose not to properly litigate the claim — when Ross was facing the death 
penalty. See, e.g.. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (courts must eschew the 
"distorting effects of hindsight" and must assess counsel's performance from the perspective 
of counsel at the time of the performance). 
Assuming that this Court agrees that the Eighth Amendment cases upon which Ross 
relies have no application, the statute under which Ross stands convicted still does not pass 
muster under the vagueness doctrine of the Utah Constitution or its federal counterpart, because 
the statutory language fails to give sufficient definition to curtail the discretion of those charged 
with enforcing and adjudicating the law, or to give sufficient notice to those who might be 
charged thereunder. See Ross's opening brief at 27-29. 
Two of the cases upon which the State relies in seeking to uphold the constitutionality 
of the "course of conduct" language tacitly recognize the vagueness of such language, by relying 
on judicial narrowing, either by appellate court opinion or trial court instructions, to find the 
language constitutional.5 Because there are no Utah decisions limiting the "course of conduct" 
aggravator, and because the trial court's instructions actually dis-served that purpose, see Ross's 
5See Corwin v. Johnson. 150 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Or. 1998) (AEDPA case applying 
significant deference to state court decision under review, court upheld statute against 
vagueness challenge in part because state court had narrowed language through its decisions, 
although the court recognized its prior decision acknowledging "room for uncertainty" in 
application of the statute); State v. Jones. 595 S.E.2d 124, 139 (N.C. 2004) (rejecting 
vagueness challenge to "course of conduct" aggravating circumstances on the basis of State 
v. Williams. 292 S.E.2d 243 (N.C. 1982), wherein similar challenge was rejected in part 
because jurors were instructed that the government had to prove that the defendant had a 
"plan, scheme, or design" to kill both people). 
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opening brief at 13-14, the vagueness of the statute undermines Ross's conviction. Cf. id. 
While the State contends that Ross had ample notice that his killing of Christensen and 
his attempted killing of May fell within the "course of conduct" language because of the 
temporal and physical proximity of the two shootings, the legislature has never indicated that 
temporal or physical proximity give meaning to "course of conduct," and neither Ross nor the 
jurors were informed that "course of conduct" is defined by or limited by reference to those two 
factors. The State's repeated claim that the murder and attempted murder also necessarily 
occurred during the same criminal episode, State's brief at 43, fails to identify the single criminal 
objective Ross was seeking to achieve to qualify for capital punishment under this language. 
IV. THE ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER CONVICTION MERGES 
INTO THE AGGRAVATED MURDER CONVICTION. 
The State erroneously asserts that because the conviction for the attempted murder of 
May does not merge into the conviction for aggravated murder of Christensen, because the 
aggravated murder statute constitutes an enhancement statute under State v. Smith. 2005 UT 57, 
122 P.3d 615. State's brief at 44-50. The Smith decision calls for our courts to apply the plain 
language of § 76-l-402(3)(a) in determining whether offenses stand as greater and lesser 
offenses, which merge. See Smith at f^ 11. Section 76-l-402(3)(a) provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the 
facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged[.] 
In order to prove the aggravated murder of Christensen, the prosecution charged, and 
was required to prove, the attempted murder of May. See R. 1-3; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
13 
202(1)(b) ("Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:... the homicide 
was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which 
two or more persons were killed, or during which the actor attempted to kill one or more 
persons in addition to the victim who was killed[.]"). Because the facts of the attempted murder 
of May were necessarily proved in, and necessary to, the prosecution of the aggravated murder 
count, Ross cannot be punished independently for the lesser offense. See Smith; 76-l-402(3)(a). 
There is nothing in the aggravated murder statute which indicates legislative intent that 
it be exempted from the application of the merger doctrine, and treated as an enhancement 
statute. See Smith at If 13 (finding expressed intent in concealed weapons statute to exempt it 
from merger statute). Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202. supra, with 76-10-504(3) (explicitly 
recognizing that most serious penalty for carrying a concealed firearm applies when a concealed 
firearm is used in a crime of violence). 
The aggravated murder statute does not create degrees of offenses, which progress in 
severity in correspondence with increasing danger to the public. See Smith at \ 13 (finding 
graduated penalties in concealed weapons statute as indication of legislative intent to exempt 
statute from merger doctrine). Compare 76-5-202 with 76-10-504 (increasing levels of offenses 
for increasingly dangerous conduct under the statute). 
The State argues that the application of the merger doctrine would lead to an absurd 
result because there should be a separate conviction recognizing and punishing the crime against 
May. The capital nature of the aggravated murder conviction amply acknowledges and punishes 
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both the shooting of May and the murder of Christensen far more extremely than would 
separate punishments, and even consecutive separate punishments for murder and attempted 
murder or aggravated assault, by qualifying Ross for extreme sentences of death, life without 
parole, or twenty years to life. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207. 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF THE ISSUES. 
The State contends that the doctrines of plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, 
and exceptional circumstances do not apply to Ross's case. State's brief at 14-17. 
The use of anonymous jury procedures was obvious error under the law established at 
the time of trial, because Ut. R. Crim. P. 18(a)(1) and (2) expressly and plainly require jurors to 
be called by name. See id. Serious criminal prosecutions have historically occurred in open 
court and on the record in this state, in part to make jurors feel accountable for their verdicts, 
see, e.g.. State v. Jordan, supra, and Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 1. The trial court's use 
of anonymous jury procedures without any cause or ameliorative measures would constitute 
obvious error in virtually any jurisdiction permitting the use of anonymous juries. See, Point I 
of the opening brief; Brown and United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 
474 U.S. 819 (1985), and cases and law review articles cited therein. As was discussed in Point 
I of the opening brief, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result in the absence of this 
error, and thus, both obvious error and prejudice are established to justify the application of the 
plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^ [ 26,128 P.3d 117. Because of the 
highly prejudicial nature of this error, this Court should correct it, even if it should not have 
been obvious to the trial court. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert. 
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denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Trial counsel's failure to timely object and assert Ut. R. Crim. P. 18 and Ross's key 
constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence, a fair trial, and to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, when the court instituted anonymous jury procedures constituted objectively 
deficient performance. See, ABA Guidelines 10.10.2 (capital defense counsel must research legal 
challenges, object to improper jury selection procedures) and 10.8 (capital defense counsel must 
assert and preserve the client's legal claims). Anonymous jury procedures were and are illegal 
under Rule 18, supra, and research on the topic demonstrating that those measures were violative 
of Ross's constitutional rights was readily available at the time of trial. See, e.g.. Brown and 
Thomas, supra. Trial counsel's failure to object is properl} recognized as failure to prepare and 
to assert the client's rights, and cannot be explained as a reasonable tactical choice, because it 
can never be in the client's best interest to undercut the client's presumption of innocence and 
to inflame the jurors personally against the client. Cf. Fisher v. Gibson. 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 
(10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting claim that repeated instances of deficient performance amounted to 
trial strategy). While trial counsel made a record of Ross's wish to be executed, and acquiescence 
to the trial only to keep his options open and because the same evidence would be admitted in 
the penalty phase (State's brief at 9, R. 434: 21-22), pursuing or permitting the entry of a capital 
conviction or sentence is not a valid legal strategy for an appointed capital lawyer to pursue.6 
6See, e.g., ABA Guidelines 10.5 and 10.7 commentary (recognizing that suicidality is 
common among capital defendants and that it is ineffective assistance for appointed capital 
lawyers to acquiesce to their clients' suicidal wishes in litigating their cases). See also State v. 
Holland. 876 P.2d 357, 360-61 and n.3 (Utah 1994)(even when client wishes to be executed, 
counsel must be a zealous and loyal advocate, and insure compliance with the law; "It is 
simply not acceptable for the proceedings on appeal or in the trial court to be pro forma"). 
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As explained in Point I of the opening brief, the use of anonymous jury procedures was 
procedurally and evidentially prejudicial to Mr. Ross. Accordingly, this Court should cure this 
error under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984). 
The use of anonymous jury procedures is fairly characterized as a "rare procedural 
anomaly," because it causes the jurors to personally fear the defendant, and skews the fact 
finding process away from the standard impartial and innocence-presuming norms which should 
prevail during a criminal trial. See Brown, supra. Because Utah R. Crim. P. 18 requires jurors 
to be called by name, and because there was neither cause for, nor measures taken to ameliorate 
the prejudice from the anonymous jury procedures, this Court should employ the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine as a safety device, and to avoid the manifest injustice which would 
otherwise occur, if the verdict of the anonymous jury were allowed to stand. See State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, U 23, 94 P.3d 18. 
The law forbidding prosecutors to misstate the evidence and the law has been the law for 
years in this State. See, e.g.. State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984). This was a very 
straightforward case with only one issue in dispute and only one witness who testified regarding 
that issue. See Point II of the opening brief. The trial court thus committed obvious error 
under this law when it failed to intervene when the prosecutor misstated the evidence so 
prejudicially on the only disputed point, which was so fundamental to Ross's defense and lesser 
included offense instruction in this capital case. See Point II of the opening brief, Lee, supra. 
As was explained in Point II of the opening brief, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
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favorable result in the absence of this error. See id. Thus, Ross has established obvious and 
prejudicial error justifying this Court's application of the plain error doctrine. See id. Because 
of the highly prejudicial nature of the prosecutor's misconduct, this Court should correct the 
error, even if it should not have been obvious to the trial court. See Eldredge, supra. 
The fact that trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's powerful inaccurate 
arguments dovetails with trial counsel's failure to object to the absence of a lesser included 
offense for attempted aggravated murder (R. 437 at 81), which naturally would have followed 
the defense theory that the murder of Christensen and attempted murder of May were not 
incident to one act, scheme, criminal episode, or course of conduct, and demonstrates failures 
to prepare this case and assert Ross's rights to his defense and lesser included offense prior to 
trial, or to pay attention and assert those rights during the trial. Trial counsel's failure to object 
to the prosecutor's undercutting of the defense also dovetails with trial counsel's failure to object 
to the absence of an instruction defining the term act as a voluntary bodily movement, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601, and failure to object to the definition of actor (R. 437 at 81),7 which may 
well have misled the jury to believe that Ross was guilty of the aggravated murder and attempted 
murder under the "incident to one act" theory merely because he was charged with both those 
offenses. Trial counsel's failure to assert and protect Ross's theory of the defense constitutes 
objectively deficient performance. See ABA Guidelines 10.8 (requiring capital defense counsel 
instruction 21 defined the term actor as follows: 
ACTOR: "Actor" means the person whose criminal responsibility is an issue 
in a criminal action. In this case, Trovon Donta Ross is alleged to have 
committed three counts of criminal conduct. He is the alleged actor. 
(R. 305). 
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to assert and preserve client's claims), 10.10.1 (requiring capital defense counsel to construct and 
assert a consistent theory of the defense). It could not have been reasonable trial strategy to sit 
idly by in observance of Ross's goal of being executed, see ABA Standards and Holland, supra, 
or to abstain from objecting and hoping the jury would not notice the prosecutor's argument in 
this situation, where the factual misrepresentations of the prosecutor went right to the heart of 
the charges and Ross's defense - the only and very subject the jury was asked to consider. See 
State v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989) (even what might be tactical decisions are 
reviewed for unreasonableness). As explained in Point II of the opening brief, the law requiring 
prosecutors to accurately argue the evidence has governed this State for years. Thus, the failure 
of trial counsel to interject when the prosecutor so prejudicially misstated the evidence was 
highly damaging to the fairness of Ross's trial, and there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result absent this error. Accordingly, this Court should cure this error under the 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. See Strickland, supra. 
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case so radically undercut Ross's rights to a fair trial, 
and to present his defense in this capital case, see Point II of the opening brief, that the 
prosecutor's misleading arguments, left uncorrected by the trial court, constitute a "rare 
procedural anomaly." Because of the unfairness of leaving Mr. Ross in prison without any hope 
of parole, when his verdict may well have entered as a result of the misconduct of the people's 
representative, this Court should correct this manifest injustice by applying the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine. See Nelson-Waggoner, supra. 
The unconstitutionality of subsection (b) of § 76-5-202 constitutes plain or obvious error, 
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because the law requiring our legislature to enact clear criminal laws, and particularly capital laws, 
was ubiquitous and well established at the time of this trial. See, e.g.. Point III of the opening 
brief. Mr. Ross is sorely prejudiced by the trial court's failure to apply this law in his case, 
because if he were not convicted under this unconstitutional statute, he would at least have the 
hope of parole someday. Because there is at least a reasonable probability of a different result 
if he were not convicted under this unconstitutional statute, this Court should grant him relief 
under the plain error doctrine. See Lee, supra. Assuming arguendo that the vagueness of the 
statute underpinning Ross's convictions should not have been plain to the trial court and trial 
counsel, this Court nonetheless has full authority to cure the error because of its highly 
prejudicial nature. See Eldredge. supra. 
Just as the trial court should have applied the governing law concerning vagueness to the 
subsection of the capital murder statute under which Ross was charged, trial counsel should have 
asserted this law on his client's behalf, and his failure to do so was objectively deficient. See. 
e.g.. ABA Guidelines 10.8 (requiring capital counsel to research and assert and preserve the 
client's rights for full judicial review in capital cases). Trial counsel's failure to assert this law on 
his client's behalf cannot be attributed to any conceivable reasonable trial strategy. Asserting his 
law could only have diminished his client's sentence in the event of conviction, and could not 
have prejudiced him in any way. In the event that the failure to challenge the statute is 
attributable to the "strategy" to obtain Ross's execution, that strategy is not legally acceptable. 
See ABA standards, Holland, supra. Trial counsel's failure to challenge the statute vigorously 
is not properly chalked up to valid trial strategy because this Court has rejected other challenges 
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to the death penalty statutes (R. 431: 12-13). Rather, this constitutes objectively deficient 
performance. See, e.g.. ABA Guidelines 10.8 (requiring capital counsel to research and assert 
and preserve the client's rights for full judicial review in capital cases). The Utah death penalty 
statute is routinely amended, see legislative history of § 76-5-202, and the common law regarding 
capital punishment is constantly changing and developing, see, e.g.. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 609 (2002)(overruling controlling precedent to hold that aggravating factor essential to 
death sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). In this case, the subsection 
of the statute underpinning that aggravated murder and murder charges is obviously subject to 
challenge for vagueness and failure to guide juror discretion, and given that this statutory 
language would determine whether Ross was convicted of capital murder or non-capital murder, 
and attempted aggravated or simple attempted murder, and was thus key to the defense and 
prosecution, trial counsel should have examined the language, researched the law, and asserted 
the obvious challenge. See ABA Guideline 10.8, supra. Even if this Court and the Tenth Circuit 
had rejected the specific claim before, trial counsel still had the obligation in this death penalty 
case to fully preserve all claims for full federal review. See id. Because Ross's sentence of life 
without parole would not be in place absent his conviction under this unconstitutional statute, 
there is a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of trial counsel's objectively 
deficient performance. Thus, this Court should grant Ross relief under the ineffective assistance 
of counsel doctrine. See Strickland, supra. 
This Court should apply the exceptional circumstances to correct this error, which exists 
because of a fundamental malfunction of our adversary system in this capital case. Trial counsel 
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and the trial court both demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of the professional 
standards which must prevail in a capital case with regard to the consideration of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty statute. Trial counsel moved to declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I §§ 7 and 9, and to declare 76-3-207 unconstitutional for failure to require unanimous 
jury verdicts under Article I § 10 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, but did not submit supporting memoranda (R. 189-193). At a pretrial hearing, trial 
counsel indicated that he had filed the motions to preserve the issues, but that since the State 
v. Daniels 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611, resolved some of the issues, and since this Court had 
decided "both of those cases" there would be no need for argument (R. 431 at 12). The 
prosecutor indicated that trial counsel had reviewed the standard motions that are filed in these 
cases, and that since they had been ruled on numerous times, he elected not to file them (R. 431 
at 13). The court applauded trial counsel's professionalism, and ruled that the issues were 
preserved (R. 431 at 13). Judge Page later entered a ruling on the motion to require unanimous 
jury verdicts, denying it on the basis of State v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611 (R. 269-271), 
and entered a ruling denying the motion to strike § 76-3-207 (R. 272-274), and then entered a 
ruling upholding the constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute, noting that there was no 
specific argument before the court, but that the statute had withheld constitutional challenges 
in the state and federal courts (R. 276-278). Rather than applauding counsel's supposed 
professionalism in failing to litigate the issue (R. 431 at 13), and rather than holding that the issue 
was preserved despite the fact that there was no specific argument before the court (R. 276-78), 
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111< • (mil <•( »urt should have required rule 8 qualified appointed counsel to represent 111* • n nil; "t 111 
client properly or withdraw from the case. Li ' «* ' { •'de 25-14-6(2) (permitting courts 
to orac: -1 ,e ' '" innointed capital defense lawyers who do not perform properly). 
Because the trial court not only tolerated, but actually condoned appointed t jpinl counsel's 
failure to comply wi; p - u . . -.ims essential to the proper functioning of the 
adversary system in this capital case, see, ABA standards, supra, this Court should .
 t , 
exceptional circumstances doctrine to correct tins r\uim •.'.-. >ee Nelson-Waggoner, 
supra. 
The trial court's failure to merge the attempted aggravated murdei u • d-e 
aggravated murder conviction coibimiK .nder the authorities which were 
CM.tbji-iu • MM .Uing years before the trial. See, Opening Brief, Point IV. There is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence oi u u> * •;«• . i x/ciuse Ross would 
nothave the attempted aggra\ ;u ci: -^uu • ».: ,1. :i :i on his record, and would not be sentenced 
;. .« nviction. This issue thus qualifies for relief under the plain error doctrine because it 
was both plain and prejudicial. See Eldredgc, supra. - .*\ •.•''- t:-"luiv to assert the well 
established law m u ^ i -.-i Rn^1 -^'half was objectively deficient. See, e.g., ABA Guideline 
10.8, State v. Smedley. 2003 UT App 79 at If 10, 67 P.3d 1005. It cannot bt aum • 
reasonable trial strategy, because no client is s u \ n ! • ^ " m additional conviction and 
sentence, ai iu .ij <j >• >mted lawyers are not permitted to function in %proforma manner, even if their 
clients are sometimes suicidal. See Holland, supra. Because there is a reasonahk hi-diin >• > 
a more favorable resuii - ;iie absence • >,, , ,v.dr. tlr-r degree felony conviction and 
sentence — this Court should grant Ross relief under the ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine. See Strickland, supra. 
Finally, this Court may apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine, because it would 
be manifesdy unjust to have Ross illegally convicted of a first degree felony and serving under 
a concurrent illegal sentence, when the law governing at the time of his conviction clearly 
required merger of the conviction. See Nelson-Waggoner, supra. 
The State's brief repeatedly complains of inadequacies in the drafting of Ross's opening 
brief, and thereby seeks to dissuade this Court from reaching the merits of the issues. State's 
brief, passim. It appears that many of the State's concerns are unfounded.8 Assuming that the 
State's arguments are correct, Ross has a right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 
See, e.g.. Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 (recognizing right to appeal in all criminal cases); 
8Ross's brief complies with all the express mandates of Utah R. App. 24, and 
accurately cites to the record and controlling authorities. While the brief certainly could have 
been longer, and can certainly be augmented, it does accurately state the standards Ross must 
meet to overcome trial counsel's failure to raise the issues, compare State's brief at 12 with 
Ross's opening brief at 38-39; does acknowledge the presumption of reasonable trial strategy, 
compare State's brief at 12 with Ross's opening brief at 39, 41, 43; and does acknowledge 
and correctly apply the obviousness prong of the plain error doctrine, compare State's brief 
at 12 with Ross's opening brief at 38, 40, 42-43, 45, 47. 
While the discussion of the preservation doctrines does not expound on the meaning 
of prejudice, the point of the brief on preservation refers back to the points on the merits to 
establish prejudice, Ross's opening brief at 41, 43, and the points on the merits correcdy 
discuss prejudice in terms of a "reasonable likelihood of a different result" Ross's opening 
brief at 15, 24. 
While the point of Ross's opening brief focusing on the preservation issue is 
somewhat truncated in its explanation of authorities which should have been raised or 
applied on Ross's behalf in the trial court, the authorities at issue were already discussed as 
they should have been applied in the preceding points of the brief discussing the merits of 
the errors. Compare State's brief at 12-13, with Ross's opening brief, Point V (the 
preservation point) and Points I-IV (the merits points). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(g) (same); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,391-97 (1985) (recognizing 
right to effective assistance of counsel in crniir. : :jy;\. '• ngln). 
T>-' i . - of the adequacy of the opening brief is something that may and should be 
determined at this juncture by this Court, so that this Court may order supplemental briefing 
and/or orcu.1 u- D u r i n g -•. :,:-h: : fiVrtivr .^sistnnce of counsel on appeal is 
effectuated. See State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994) (Court disqualified appointed 
capital lawyer from appeal for failure to act as a zealous au\ » >caic;, Mmi: \. l'humas, JOO^ ' r';1 
JSJ " ' •••me's dissenting opinion, 2005 WL 729661 (unpublished decision) 
(arguing that in criminal cases, appellate courts should demand effective assistance of counsel 
on appeal, by striking inadequate u n c ^ , u-qumm; M .KU .. . ;K .; .rtiK-ni i1- hrirts, 
and /or appointing substitute counsel). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(h) (recognizing Court's 
authority to strike non-compliant briefs and assess attorneys fees). 
CONCLUSION 
Because the cumulative procedural and evidentiary prejudice caused by the errors 
discussed herein undermines reasonable commence n , - .;nu i r iuh ik the 
proceeding.. thi^ <"ourt should order a new trial 
Respectfully submitted on Auc&^tJ 
E f £a1j)feth Ht 
Counk^l for Mi. Ross 
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